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REFLECTIONS ON THE TACTICS OF THE 
ATTACK.' 
By Major I .  M. HOME, 2nd K.E.O.  Gurkha Rifles, 
Dep.  Assistant Adjutant-General, Aldershot Command. 
THE object of war is to defeat the enemy, and so force him 
to agree to the terms of the victor. As no battle can ever be won 
by merely defensive action, and no campaign can be really 
satisfactorily brought to an end by merely preventing the enemy 
winning-to terminate a liar successfully an offensive 76Ze must 
sooner or later be adopted, naturally culminating in the tactical 
attack on the battlefield. 
In the same way as the handling of troops is divided into 
strategy and tactics, or the giving of the original impulse to the 
movements of armies and the handling of those armies when in 
contact with the enemy, tactics may be divided into grand and 
minor tactics; by which terms I mean the setting in motion of the 
larger bodies (after contact has been established) to carry out 
the plans of the commander, and the handling of the various 
components of those uni ts  when actually under fire. 
Battles are fought, not by machines, but by men, conse- 
quently the human element plays an all important part in war. 
It is thus most important before discussing the tactical attack and 
the best means of planningit, and the best formations for carry- 
i n g  it out, to consider the human element, and to form some ideas 
as to what losses troops may be expected to bear without refusing 
to go on. Theoretically, troops, well trained and well dis- 
ciplined, should always advance if told to, but practically we 
know a time comes when the best troops in the world yill not 
respond, and will refuse to advance; this time comes sooner or 
later, according as the discipline' and moral is bad or good, as 
thecommander has not the confidence of the men or the reverse, 
as the cause of the war is not popular or the contrary, etc., but 
sooner or later the psychological moment arrives. 
In considering this question it is necessary to insist upon 
the fact (fully proved by the war in Manchuria) that modern 
battles, owing to the improvement in arms, which cause losses 
at much greater distances than formerly, will last for days. This 
fact causes a much severer strain on the troops engaged, who 
suffer losses at much greater distances, and spread over a much 
longer time than in former days. 
Added to this, we must not lose sight of the fact that the 
spread of education, and the improvements in the conditions of 
1This article was written in Kovember, 1907, but was not forwarded 
for publication until some months later. 
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REFLECTIONS ON THE TACTICS OF THE ATTACK. 1631 
life in  \Vestern European countries and America, have made 
life much more worth living, and consequently there is a corres- 
ponding desire to avoid losing it ; it would, therefore, hardly be 
wise to accept the losses, often borne unflinchingly by the 
Japanese when attacking, as a standard of what Western 
European troops will face, 
In no European nation is there the same veneration for the 
departed, which veneration may bc said to be part and parcel 
of the Japanese religion; nowhere is there the same almost 
fanatical loyalty to the sovereign, united with the most intense 
patriotism, as is the case in Japan, and it is these factors which 
have inculcated a contempt for death, and readiness to meet it, 
which no Western nation can hope to emulate. W e  have seen 
not once, but repeatedly, troops driven back with 30 and 40 per 
cent. losses being re-formed and led again and again to a final 
successful assault over ground strewn with the bodies of their 
dead and dying comrades. 
It is therefore most important that a commander should care- 
fully consider what losses he may expect his men to face, before 
refusing to advance, and not to ask them to undertake operations 
which are likely to rise above this maximum, otherwise he mill 
only be courting disaster. In this connection it may not be out 
of place to insist that British commanders, owing to the strictly 
limited supply of trained material available, must also consider 
this question from another point of view, namely, can they 
undertake operations entailing heavy losses. 
In the past we have had what is called the defensive-offensive 
deliberately adopted by commanders whose troops were just as 
numerous, and just as well disciplined, trained and equipped, as 
those of the enemy. The success of this system depends upon 
a n  absolutery correct appreciation of the situation and the possi- 
bility of being able to immediately direct all large tactical u n i t s  
along the whole front of battle ; under modern conditions, how- 
ever, where the front of the troops engaged extends for many 
miles, such a state of affairs is no l'onger possible, and a com- 
mander adopting such an attitude might find himself beaten i n  
detail though actually having larger numbers than his adversary ; 
such was practically always the case with the Russians in 
hlanchuria. Though the spirit of the training of the Russian 
Army was offensive, and though there were always reserves kept 
in hand for counter-strokes, they were never employed for this 
purpose, as they were never available where required, but spent 
their time aimlessly marching and counter-marching, and 
generally only came in to  action to cover the retreat of the army, 
largely owing to the incorrect appreciation of the situation by the 
Russian commanders, and to their inability (thanks to the 
enormous extent of front), to control the action of these reserves 
at the critical moment. 
A study of the battle-fields of, say, Waterloo and Gravelotte, 
will illustrate my meaning, and yet the front occupied at Grave- 
lotte was as  nothing to that occupied at Liao-yang, and even less 
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1632 REFLECTIONS ox THE TACTICS OF THE ATTACK. 
in comparison with that a t  hlukden. At \\raterloo the small 
extent of the front enabled Wellington to be in touch with his 
whole line and to personally follow the fortune of the battle along 
the whole front, whereas at Gravelotte it was impossible for 
Rloltlte to know what was going on beyond his immediate neigh- 
bourhood, and he had to depend upon the messages sent in by 
the various commanders to Itno\v horn the fight went elsewhere, 
and from the nature of things, due to  considerations of time and 
space, the conditions might haye, and had, materially altered 
before he received the messages in question. 
In modern v a r  a commander cannot control the action of a 
single Army Corps by personal observation, and must be depen- 
dent upon the information received from his subordinates. It is 
true that modern commanders possess telephones, telegraphs, 
and visual signalling, which enable them to keep in touch with 
their subordinates, but the failurc of a single link may upset all 
calculations, and even with these appliances, by the time im- 
portant news has passed through the different transmitting 
authorities, the original conditions may have materially altered. 
Thus modern conditions due to the enormous extent of the 
battlefields of to-day render the personal observation of the 
battlefield, so necessary for a defensive-offensive action, an im- 
possibility, and consequently it is improbable that a commander 
will adopt such a 78Ie if he is in any way on an equality with his 
adversary. 
Tlic initiative is the key of success whether in strategy or 
tactics, and this is so universally recognised that we may expect 
to find all commanders endLTvouring to assume the offensive, 
and one would therefore imagine that all modern battles would 
partake of the nature of encounter battles, and that both sides 
would simultaneously attack. 
This may appear to be tile natural result of modern condi- 
tions, but practically it will seldom be the case, for a multitude 
of reasons, real inferiority, bacltwardness in mobilisation, defec- 
tive initial strategy, and, above all, the human element (a weak 
and vacillating man opposed to a strong determined one) will 
cause one side to assunie the defensive, the other the offensive; 
nothing is easier than when in doubt to take up a position, 
assume the defensive and satisfy one’s better military feelings by 
promising one’s-self to take the offensive later on. The initiative 
is, however, seldom regained, especially when voluntarily given 
UP. 
A41though it will probably be the exception, a short con- 
sideration of the encounter battle may not be out of place. 
Let u s  assume, then, that the two opposing armies, each 
bent  on the offensive, are in actual contact with their advanced 
guards. Though contact has been established, and both sides 
are attacking, the fog of war will be particularly thick, and the 
Generals in Chief, who, from the practice of modern war are 
some distance in rear, will have only a very vague idea of what 
is happening, added to this, assuming several Army Corps on 
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REFLECTIONS ON THE TACTICS OF THE ATTACK. 1633 
either side, the front of contact will be wide and the various re- 
ports coming in will be most conflicting. 
I n  suc1i.a state of affairs the commander who first makes UP 
his.mind and energetically carries out his plans is morally certacn 
to win, as he will have thrown a preponderating force on some 
given point and pushed home his attack before his adversary has 
really learnt where the blow is coming. To rapidly come to a 
decision and to rapidly carry it out requires good information 
and good means of communication, for good intelligence is use- 
less unless it can be speedily communicated to the supreme com- 
mander, and quick and sound decisions are of little use if the 
orders to give effect to them cannot be readily Communicated 
to the subordinate commanders who have to carry them out. 
We thus see that other things being equal, the commander 
who gets the best information will make the best decision, and 
that to malie a speedy decision the information must reach him 
quickly ; consequently the first and most important elements 
of success, other things being equal, are good and quick recon- 
naissance and good and rapid means of communication. Thus 
a successful attack in an encounter battle, other things being 
equal, depends more on reconnaissance and telephones, tele- 
graphs or visual signalling than on tactics a s  the term is 
generally understood. Success therefore in such an encounter 
as we have been considering, though the consideration is little 
more than academic, depends largely upon intelligence and com- 
munication, which, if good, will make up for many other 
deficiencies, and place a numerically inferior army on an equality 
or even malie it superior to a much larger hostile force, in which 
the intelligence, reconnaissance, and communication services are 
inferior. 
In reality, however, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, 
no matter what the original ideas of the respective commanders 
may have been, one will take up a position. 
Positions may either be carefully prepared or merely 
strengthened by rapid field fortifications. 
If the defence has been decided upon from the outset we may 
expect to find the selected position so fortified as to be in reality 
a field fortress; if this is the case and strategical reasons demand 
its capture, progress will be slow and will approsimate to the 
gradual approach to a real fortress requiring most careful recon- 
naissance and preparation, such an attack is outside the scope 
of this paper, being in reality fortress and not field warfare. 
For the purposes of this paper let us assume that the adver- 
sa'ry, for what reason is immaterial, has decided on defensive 
action and has taken up and hastily fortified a position to bar our 
forward advance. We may try and manmuvre him out of it, 
but by so doing we shall not gain a tactical success, and whilst 
the hostile main army remains undefeated we cannot hope to 
bring the campaign to a successful close, we must therefore 
harden our hearts and attack him in order to defeat him. Before 
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1634 REFLECTIONS ON TIIE TACTICS OF THE ATTACK. 
considering the tactics to be employed it may be as well- to try 
and see what the enemy’s line of action will be. 
Owing to improvements in arms the tendency of modern 
tactics is to extension and consequently a position can be he!d 
with many fewer men than formerly, thus one of two things w l l  
happen, the position will be much more estensive, or the enemy 
will keep many more men in reserve for counter-strokes, by 
which alone an army on the defensive can hope to gain a tactical 
success. In  reality, however, Xve may expect to find a combina- 
tion of the two. Owing to this greater estension and consequent 
increase in the size of positions, it may very well happen that 
reserves are too far away from the decisive point to influence the 
issue, or if they are too much split up they will be too weak to 
successfully fulfil their 6 1 e .  Thus we may expect to find the 
defender adopting every possible means to find out as early as 
possible where the real blow is coming and the attacker must be 
equally solicitous to conceal the point of his real and decisive 
attack. The  defender may therefore be espected to form a series 
of false fronts to deceive the attacker and thus endeavour to make 
him disclose the direction of his main attack. 
It appears therefore that we may espect the attack of a posi- 
tion to consist of three stages, the approach, the preparation, 
and the assault. The approach will consist of driving in the 
false fronts and the location of the real position ; the preparation 
of the reconnaissance of the real position, and the framing of the 
commander’s plans for its attack; the assault of the carrying out 
of these plans in the tactical attack on  the position. 
Having arrived thus far we can now proceed to consider each 
of these stages in detail. 
T H E  L\PPROAC€I. 
Whatever may have led up to it, the situation will be that 
the advanced cavalry has been checked and cannot get on ; and 
beyond the fact that there are infantry and g u n s  in front nothing 
further can be ascertained. This information has been sent to 
the General-in-Chief some considerable distance behind, and the 
cavalry leaving small bodies in contact along the front has drawn 
away to the flanks, to try and gain as much information as 
possible regarding the hostile position. 
At this stage the cavalry requires careful handling as the 
situation is not clear and the Commander-in-Chief requires early 
information as to  what is in his immediate front, whether it is a 
false front or the hostile army in position. 
I The cavalry leader must  be enterprising and energetic, other- 
wise he may find himself with the bulk of his mounted men 
o p p i n g  only a small force of the hostile cavalry, whilst its main 
body is active on the other flank, pushing back the weaker 
mounted troops opposed to it, endeavouring to find out what 
is going on behind, and harassing the advancing columns. 
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REFLECTIONS o w  THE TACTICS OF THE ATTACK. 1635 
Should such a situation arise the inferior cavalry must make 
the fullest use of dismounted action in order to keep back the 
superior cavalry until the arrival of reinforcements, cavalry or 
infantry, enables it to regain its freedom of movement. 
The 781c of the cavalry is therefore clear in this phase, viz., 
reconnaissance, but it must be prepared to make the fullest use 
of dismounted fire action to prevent the hostile mounted troops 
driving it back, and so hinder and inconvenience the advancing 
columns it  is covering. 
On receipt of information that hostile troops are in position 
in front the General-in-Chief will direct his advanced troops to 
drive them in, and close up his main bodies to well within sup- 
port ing distance. He must, however, not deploy too many men, 
or show his hand at this initial stage, but should keep as large 
bodies as possible in  hand so that he may be able to move them 
to the spot against which his main effort will be made in the 
actual assault. 
The advanced troops, however, must attack vigorously, for 
the amount of resistance met with will soon show whether it is 
only a false front 9r the hostile army in position that has to be 
dealt with. Should it turn out to be the hostile army in position, 
the action to be taken is that described under The Preparation, 
(see later), but if it appears that it is only a false front it must be 
driven in.as rapidly as possible, for the longer the adversary is 
unmolested on his position the more spade work he will do, and 
consequently the stronger his position is likely to become. 
Let u s  assume it is a false front to be dealt with. In such a 
case the defence will only employ a few troops to hold this line, 
’and will be really fighting a delaying action of the nature of a 
rear-guard one ; the minor tactics of this phase may and should 
be bold, extensions may be wider, reserves may be dispensed 
with, and the artillery should move right up in support of the 
infantry attack. As time is so important in the state of affairs we 
are considering the commander must trust to his cavalry to have 
correctly gauged the situation and attack boldly, and take risks 
which w’ould be unwise did he suspect anything in front of him 
beyond a false front or screen ; the closing up of the main bodies, 
if  communication is carefully maintained, will be a prccaution 
against defeat in detail should he have been mistaken and the 
screen turn out to be the position. Should this turn out to be the 
case it will soon b’e manifest, for the attacking troops will be 
quickly checked, but they should at all costs strive to maintain 
their ground, for yhich purpose the spade must be brought into 
action as well as the rifle. It the troops are not themselves carry- 
ing an entrenching tool, they will be at a great disadvantage, as it 
will be found next to impossible to bring up the wagons carrying 
thle tools. 
Should all’go well and the screen be driven in,  the line occu- 
pied should be at once entrenched, so that the main bodies in 
rear may be safe to march unmolested to the places which will 
be assigned to them, under cover of the advanced troops. The 
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1636 REPLECTIOSS ON THE TACTICS OF THE ATTACK. 
entrenching tools are immediately required whatever happens, 
and unless the men have them on their persons it is doubtful 
whether they will ever get them. 
In the attack of the false front, artillery, though most useful, 
does not appear to be so vitally necessary as in the final assault. 
The enemy will not have many guns available; his force will 
be small, and the position will presumably be neither heavily 
fortified nor obstinately held. If a large force of artillery is 
employed, the g u n s  once committed to action will be hard to 
collect again for the massed fire which will be required for the 
assault. It appears, therefore, that the troops detailed for the 
attack should be at once deployed and pushed on boldly, with 
practically no reserves kept back, but all parts of the line mutually 
assisting one another, the g u n s  closely supporting the infantry 
and using direct preferably to indirect laying. ,It,  of course, 
goes without saying that every possible advantage of ground 
should be taken, and every endeavour made to bring enfilade and 
converging fire to bear on the defence. 
The main characteristics of this phase are, therefore, intelli- 
gence, communication, boldness, absence of elaborate recon- 
naissance and preparation, and last but not least, entrenching 
tools immediately available to put the ground captured 
into a state of defence. If the attack has been well handled and 
has been ordinarily fortunate, we may expect to find the false 
front driven in the first day ; the earlier this has taken place the 
better, but we will assume that the attack has definitely occupied 
the front lately held by the defence by sundown. 
During the day a certain amount of information has been 
gained as to the position of the enemy, and during the night 
orders are issued for the further advance next day, when the 
second stage or preparation for the assault will commence. 
THE PREPARATIOS. 
By night the troops proceed with the entrenching, and 
making good the line won during the day ; work should not be 
stopped or the troops allowed to rest until  a strong defensive 
line has been created; this is absolutely necessary in order that 
no counter-attack of the enemy may drive back the advanced 
troops and so interfere with and disturb the main bodies in rear. 
It follows, ;is a matter of course, that patrols are sent out towards 
the enemy and all suitable measures for security taken, and 
that all men not digging or on outpost duty are allowed to get 
what rest and sleep they can. Side by side with these tactical 
operations there is much administrative work to be done; un i t s  
mixed up have to be sorted out and reorganised, ammunition 
to be replenished, rations to be distributed, wounded collected 
and sent to the rear, the orders for the nest day to be written 
and issued, all requiring much time and care, and none of which 
can be omitted. 
The preliminary fighting which I have designated “ The 
Approach,” has led to the conclusion that the adversary has 
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REFLECTIONS ON THE TACTICS OF THE ATTACK. 1637 
decided on defensive action, and consequently has surrendered 
the initiative. If there is any force in the argument advanced 
against defensive-offensive action being deliberate1 adopted in 
implies inferiority. The attacker therefore starts with two great 
advantages : the initiative and a feeling of superiority, vhich 
combined justify him in taking risks in the stage of the action 
which will now be considered. 
Before proceeding further we must consider the formation of 
the troops holding the defensive position. The tendency of 
modern tactics is to extension, to avoid losses (as no troops can 
live in close formations under modern fire properly directed), 
and to obtain the greatest effect from the modern rifle, which 
can only be done if every man under fire can use his weapon. 
IVe might therefore expect the extent of front occupied to be 
limited only by the number of men available, allowing one man 
per yard, with small reserves to replace casualties, which 
reserves, it may be observed, should be close enough up to take 
the place of casualties without exposing themselves, being at 
the same time under cover, so as to avoid losses when not 
actually firing. As, however, a battle cannot be won by merely 
preventing the enemy winning, arrangements must be made for 
offensive action in the shape of counter-strokes, for which large 
reserves must be available. The actual front occupied, there- 
fore, must allow for these reserves. But the front must be 
sufficiently extensive to compel the attacker to extend over a 
wide front in order to have some chance of launching a counter- 
stroke at  some weak spot in the attack. Thus we see that the 
position must be extended in order to force the attack to extend, 
and must be so occupied that reserves of suflicient strength are 
available to make really powerful counter-strokes. If the defence 
is too thick, fire effect is lost; the attack is not forced to extend 
and can envelop both flanks and surround the defence, which in 
such an extreme case of over-concentration would have no space 
in which to manceuvre its reserves, and they would be exposed 
in close formations to the full effect of modern fire. 
\Vith the large forces we are by assumption dealing with, 
the extent of front occupied will be very extended, and con- 
sequently the large reserves mill be widely separated (for i f  
there are reserves everywhere they must of necessity be weak, 
and only sufficiently strong to make local counter-strokes), and 
if the attack is energetically handled, when the point for the 
final assault has been decided on, there will not be time to 
collect them for the decisive counter-stroke, which cannot be 
advantageously delivered until the situation has finally 
developed. 
The attacker must endeavour to find out the weak and 
strong points of the position, and if possible locate the 
reserves and main gun positions before making any decisive 
attack; this can only be done by reconnaissance, and as such 
reconnaissance, to be of real use, must force the defence to 
disclose its positions, it mill entail fighting all along the line. 
preference to offensive action, the assumption o Y the defence 
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1638 IU3>LECTIONS ON THE TACTICS OF THE ATTACK. 
This fighting must consist of simultaneous attacks all along the 
front, otherwise no really useful deductions can be made, and 
it is these attacks I have named “The Preparation,” and are 
what I propose now to consider. 
As so much depends upon the proper preparation of the 
assault (in fact, it appears not too much to say that success or 
failure is assured at this stage), I propose, at the risk of being 
tedious, to consider, in detail, the preparatory phase which 
appears to be the considering stage as opposed to the daring 
stage, so aptly described in the German saying: “ First 
consider, then dare.” 
It is generally recognised that a modern battle, due to the 
improvement in arms, use of the spade, etc., lasts more than 
one day, and is a step-by-step process, each piece of ground 
gained being used as a fresh starting point or a point from 
which to cover the advance of neighbouring bodies of troops with 
fire. In this step-by-step advance one great and important point 
niust ever be borne in mind, and that is, never give the enemy 
any rest, as, if not engaged in fighting, he will- be digging, 
and every hour of spade work will increase the difficulties of the 
attack. 
In the preparatory stage, which is really a reconnaissance 
in force or attack all along the line (from which, however, there 
must be no going back, and all ground gained must be held 
at  all costs), the attacker can operate with many fewer men than 
one might expect; for the defender, not knowing where the main 
attack is being made, and consequently where the main masses 
are collected, will hesitate to commit his reserve to strong 
counter-strokes until the situation has sufficiently developed to 
enable these points to be determined with some certainty. Until 
these points are cleared up, a strong counter-stroke may be 
wasted by being launched against a portion of the attacking line, 
the defeat of which will have no influence on its commander’s 
plans, or may stumble against such strength as mill of necessity 
entail its defeat. Such considerations justify a general taking 
r i s k  at this stage which in other circumstances would be most 
unwise. 
For these reasons, therefore, the idea of having a-large force 
of artillery with the advanced guard and immediately putting 
in a large mass of g u n s  and thus forming a great central battery 
on which as on a framework the battle is built up, does not seem 
sound ; if a-large mass of g u n s  is employed at an early stage their 
position is known and the defence will take steps to prevent any 
success attending a general assault in this portion of the line, and 
being already committed they will not be available to open an 
unexpected and ovenvhelming fire on the portion of the posi- 
tion selected for attack, as soon as the infantry advance to the 
assault. For this reason it would appear better to keep back the 
main masses of the artillery until the actual portion of the posi- 
tion to be assaulted has been decided upon. 
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REFLECTIONS O S  THE TACTICS OF THE ATTACK. 1639 
’The General-in-Chief has presumably framed his plan of 
attack in outline before the actual approach, by the end of the 
approach stage the information received from the.  front has 
probably cleared up some doubtful points and he has no doubt 
decided where approximately he will make his main attack and 
where approsimateiy he will feint. 
The general lines have, we may therefore assume, been 
settled, and the preparation will enable the “ how ” the attack is 
to be carried out to be finally decided. 
I he orders for the second day can, however, be only general, 
each of the larger units will be given a certain section of front, 
those units making the secondary attacks the largest, those the 
feints somewhat kss, and those selected for the main attack the 
smallest frontage of all. 
In these orders certain troops will be detailed as a general 
reserve (or reserves if the line is very estended) in the hands of 
the G.0.C.-in-Chief, and the general commanding the Army 
Corps which is to make the main assault will probably receive 
instructions to hold back the greater part of his force. 
The orders to the above effect will be issued the night of the 
occupation of the enemy’s false front, and instructions will no 
doubt be issued to each of the corps commanders explaining the 
G.0.C.-in-Chief’s plans more in detail. 
The orders for the preparation can only be very general, as 
nothing very much regarding the enemy’s real position can have 
been found out during the approach; in fact, i t  is quite possible 
that the cavalry have not really located the flanks. This wilr all 
be found out during the preparatory stage, when the cavalry can 
be helped by aerial observation ; too much reliance must not, 
however, be placed on such observation, as though folds of the 
ground can be seen into, if the country is at all wooded, observa- 
tion will be much impeded, if not altogether prevented. 
It is impassible to talk of infantry, cavalry or artillery tac- 
tics, as such, for there is no such thing as infantry, etc., tactics. 
Tactics are the combined action of the three arms, so it will be 
impossible to consider them apart. It will, however, possibly be 
correct to deal with the action of the independent cavalry 
separately from that of the large mixed bodies of troops such as 
Army Corps, for though they all work in harmony still there-is 
not that intimate connection between the independent cavalry 
and the Army Corps as there is between the components of Army 
Corps or divisions. 
We can now proceed to consider in detail the action of the 
independent cavalry and of the corps or divisions which the Com- 
rnander-in-Chief has for his line of battle. As a correct 
knowledge of the extent of the enemy’s position is necessary to 
enable the Commander-in-Chief to malie adequate plans to 
capture it, the independent cavalry working on the flanks must 
make quite certain that they are correctly located, and the obser- 
vations made in the air must be carefully checked by the reports 
from the cavalry. 
,. 
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1640 REFLECTIONS O S  THE TACTICS OF THE ATTACK. 
The mounted troops of the attack, working .wide on thk 
flanks will without a doubt encounter those of the defence, and 
a conflict will ensue, it is quite possible and very probable that 
th,e defending cavalry will, if the ground is at all suitable, 6e able 
to stop that of the attack, for with rifle and horse artillery fire, 
cavalry have a defensive power nowadays which is possibly some- 
times not sufficiently appreciated. For this reason it is more 
than possible that the enemy’s horse will stop ours from advanc- 
i n g  and that there will be considerable delay and possible stale- 
mate so far as the rival horsemen are concerned. Yet the flanks 
of the hostile position must be located before the G.0.C.-in-Chief 
can frame his plans, and this must be the duty of the cavalry, 
which has been in touch longer with the adversary and has OP- 
portunities of working wide to the flanks not possessed by the 
slower moving infantry; as soon as  the flanks have been 
approsiniately fised, and the commander has issued his orders, 
the independent cavalry must take up the r d e  of screening the 
movements of its own troops. 
The minor tactics of the mounted troops on the flanks are 
therefore both reconnaissance and screening, primarily tlie latter, 
for it is of the most vital importance to keep the defence from 
knowing what the attack is doing. The independent cavalry 
will, therefore, have much defensive \vorli to do, and the greatest 
advantage must be taken of fire effect to fulfil this 76k. In this 
connection it will be necessary to take special precautions to stop 
officers’ patrols getting through the defensive line. During the 
preparation, however, the cavalry leaders must not hesitate to 
attack i f  opportunity offers, for by so doing the impression that 
the real attack has commenced will be heightened and tho mystifi- 
cation of the enemy increased. IVith this end in view the more 
advantage that is taken of the defensive power of cavalry due to 
the fire effect of the magazine rifle, the more men will be available 
for mounted work and shock action, which is the only really 
satisfactory offensive action cavalry are capable of. Whatever 
action of this nature may be undertaken, the cavalry leader must 
bear in  mind that once the supreme commander has issued his 
attack orders his major r6le is to conceal the movements of his 
own troops, and thus keep the defence in ignorance of what is 
going on as  long as possible. 
Haring briefly sketched out the tactics of the independent 
cavalry on the flanks, let u s  now consider the action of the troops 
comprising what, for want of a better term, I will call the line 
of battle troops. A few remarks as to the position of the supreme 
commander on the battlefield may not be out of place. The 
position selected by the General-in-Chief as  the site of his head- 
quarters on the battlefield, being the nerve centre, so to speak, 
of the whole army, must be ~ c l l  known and easily found by all 
subordinate leaders, as any change of the position of the G.0.C. -  
in-Chief will upset the whole communication arrangement of the 
battle-field, telegraphs, telephones, signal stations, etc. Success, 
as we have already shown, depends not only on accurate infor- 
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REFLECTIOSS ON THE TACTICS OF T H E  ATTACK. 1641 
mation, but on the rapid receipt of this information by the 
supreme commander. ’Thus anything which delays the rapid 
forwarding of information tends to pronlote failure; it is there- 
fore of vital importance that the position of the supreme com- 
mander should remain unaltered till the battle is lost or won, and 
must therefore be so far removed from the fighting line that all 
thought of danger may be put on one side, and the commander 
and his staff may devote all their time and energy to the con- 
sideration of the problem before them. There should be 
telegraphic certainly, and if possible telephonic coniniunication 
also, between the G.0.C.-in-Chief and his corps commanders, or  
whatever the group commanders may be called with whom he 
deals; the former for all messages, orders, etc., the latter for 
personal conversation between the general and his subordinates. 
This is, however, ideal, and in practice one of these means of 
communication will have to suffice. En fassatlt it may not be 
out  of place to insist that i t  is the duty of the staff to withhold all 
harrowing details from their chief, such, for esample as the num- 
k r  of casualties sustained in  an unsuccessful attack; the G.0.C.- 
in-Chief has to think and accept all responsibility, and it is quite 
unnecessary to add to the load he has to bear by informing him 
that he has lost 10,000 men, ; it  will be quite sufficient to tell him 
that an attack has failed, time enough to give ful l  details when 
the issue has been finally decided. 
The major tactics of the preparation would appear 
to consist of attacks all along the line with widely extended 
troops who are apparently bent on pushing home, but who 
are really only drawing the enemy’s fire and making good 
certain natural features as points d’np.pzii, with considerable re- 
serves held back especially strong in g u n s  in rear of that portion 
of the line which i t  is thought will make the main attack when 
the assault is ordered. Under cover of this simulated general 
attack, careful reconnaissance of the position is being carried 
out, lines of approach are being noted, artillery oficers are 
selecting gun positions and taking ranges with a view to the 
main assault when ordered. 
During this stage it is much more important to stop the 
enemy seeing what we are doing than to find o u t  what he is 
doing; the attack having the initiative, the defender is not likely 
to strike out any new line for himself, and consequently is not 
likely to be moving troops about on the position. 
As some data must be assumed, we will consider that the 
enemy, slightly inferior in numbers to ourselves, has roughly 
fortified a position several miles in extent-the actual extent does 
not much matter-and that v e  are attacking with an army of a 
certain number of divisions-the number for our purpose does 
not very much matter.. .We mill naturally consider divisions 
constituted as British divisions now are, i.e., 3 brigades of field 
artillery, 2 batteries of howitzers, I of heavy artillery, 3 brigades 
of infantry, 2 companies of mounted infantry,  2 field companies, 
and the usual auxiliary services, telegraph, supply and transport 
companies and field ambulances. 
VOL. LII. S G  
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1642 l<tl;LECTIOSS 0s TilE T.\CTICS OF THE ATTACK. 
t i t  thc stage \ye have arrived at, the General O%cer Coin- 
manding-in-Chief can only have niade very general plans based 
on the general strategical position, for he knows nest to nothing 
about the position ot the enemy, its strong or weal; points, and 
indeed he u i l l  have been exceedingly \veil served by liis cavalry 
i f  the true flanks have been accurately fixed. 
\\re have assumed that the general plan of action on which 
tlie orders for the preparatory action are framed will be an 
attack all along the line with the object of keeping tlie enemy 
engaged all along his front, and so mystify and mislead him 
as to \\here the real attack is coming; to heighten his mystifica- 
tion, a feint against one flank will probably be resorted to, 
wliereas tlie real attack is planned to take place against the 
other. The flank which the Commander-in-Chief intends to 
attack can at this stage only be fixed by strategical considera- 
tions, and \\it11 this object in view he will keep back his, as 
opposed to his subordinates' reserves, in the neighbourhood of 
that flank. As the fight progresses the plans may be altered, 
as it may be found more feasible to pierce the centre than to 
drive in a flank. All that can be said at this stage is that the 
front will be divided u p  amongst divisions and as large reserves 
as possible held back, massed near tlie llanlis, the largest reserve 
near that flank which for strategical reasons appears to be the 
one against which the main efiort should be made. 
This plan of keeping general reserves near the flanks may 
appear dangerous, but risks must be taken. The enemy has 
probably stationed his reserves on the flanlis too, and if the 
forces engaged are not very large, the defensive power of 
modern arms is so great that even if the defender issues from his 
position and attempts a counter-stroke against any part of the 
attacking line, that part with its local reserves should be able to 
maintain its position until the C.-in-C. can send reinforcements. 
On the other hand, i f  the forces are very large they will have 
been divided into armies or Army Corps, and each group com- 
mander will have his reserves wherewith to meet any such 
counter-stroke, and as suming  inferiority in numbers on the side 
of the defender, if he issues out to pierce the centre of the attack, 
his vital flank may be turned, and his line rolled up, whilst he 
is endeavouring to overcome the resistance of the hostile centre 
by assumption now acting on the defensive. 
It seems to be very doubtful n-hether any coniniander attack- 
i n g  with a n  army composed of several divisions would have his 
heavy artillery distribuled one battery per division, and it 
appears more probable that he would group them into brigades 
of two or three batteries. These g u n s  are so powerful and long 
ranging that it appears doubtful policy to leave them in the hands 
of subordinates, they should be a t  the disposal of the C.-in-C. 
in the case of small armies, or in the hands of the Army Corps 
commanders in the case of large ones. 
The orders issued for the preparatory stage as already nien- 
tinned can only be very general, and beyond assigning certain 
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REFLECTlOSS 0s THE TACTICS OF T H E  ATTACK. 1643 
fronts’to each division, army corps, or army (~vith instructions 
to attack to their front within those limits), are not likely to 
contain anything very definite. 
For the purpose of this paper I propose to consider the action 
of a division to which a frontage of five miles has been allotted, 
this appearing to be about the estent of front a unit of the 
strength of a 13ritish division might take up in the preparatory 
as opposed to the final stage of an attack on an army holding a 
position from which i t  is desired to eject it. 
The ground gained during the approach stage has by 
hypothesis been entrenched, villages put in to  a state of defence 
and otherwise generally fortified, so that the division advances 
as from a fortified base when advancing to the attack in the 
preparatory stage. 
It must again be insisted on that the preparatory stage is 
really of-the nature of a reconnaissance in force, from which, 
however, there must be no going back; all ground won must be 
immediately entrenched and held to the last. This steady 
advance will mystify and mislead the enemy, and keep him in 
doubt as  to where the real blow is coming. It is the attackers’ 
object during the preparation so to prepare and arrange for this 
blow, that when it is delivered it will come with such strength 
and such suddenness that the defence will not have time to bring 
u p  its reserves to ward it off. 
l ire cannot, I think, assume that the attack will have got 
nearer than five miles of the main position at the end of the 
approach stage. That is, the attack will have reached a line 
about that distance from the main defensive position, when it 
was discovered that the first resistance met with was only from 
troops occupying a false front and that the general line of the 
main position could only be roughly fised. It is therefore from 
some such distance as five miles that the attack in the preparatory 
stage will start from. 
. Aerial observation with our present appliances, captive 
balloons or kites, gives fairly good results up to five miles; 
consequently, the attack must remember that its movements can 
be seen and will be reported to the hostile Commander-in-Chief, 
unless its troops are moved about in very estended order or in 
very close country, i.e., full of woods or houses, etc. If, how- 
ever, the claims made by aeronauts, that the appearance of a 
dirigible balloon, aeroplane, or what not, is only a matter of 
possibly months, turns out to be true, we may expect to have 
observers hanging over us i n  the air, and consequently screening 
our movements will be much more difficult, and if the country 
is not very close, all movements of troops before the actual assault 
will have to be made by night, if there is any desire to conceal 
movements from the defence, which is absolutely necessary if 
the attack desires to take full advantage of surprise-one of the 
greatest elements for the success of the tactics sketched out in 
this paper. 
The divisional general has had by hypothesis five miles of 
front allotted to him over which to attack. Without wishing to 
5 G 2  
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1644 REFLECTIOSS ON THE TACTICS OF T H E  ATTACK. 
lay down any hard and fast rules, it may not be w o n g  to assume 
that he will have two brigades in the first line and keep a third 
in reserve; each brigadier will no doubt be allotted two or three 
groups of M.1; to act as orderlies, and for certain, seeing the 
importance-ever increasing-of fortification in the field, half a 
company of engineers will be assigned to each brigade in the 
front line. IVhether g u n s  should be given to brigadiers or not 
is open to much argument, and will largely depend on the 
nature of the ground; personally I think in combined operations 
where a division is acting as  a part of a larger force, it is 
better not to give guns to brigadiers, but that the divisional 
general should keep them in his own hands. If, however, guns 
are handed to brigadiers, I doubt the advisability of giving them 
more than a section, or at the very outside, a battery. The extent 
of front allotted to brigades depends eniirely upon the nature of 
the ground. It is impossible even to suggest, for one brigade 
may have open country and the other close ground to advance 
over. For the sake of argument, let us assunie the front is 
equally divided, and consequently two and a half miles is 
allotted to each brigade. When saying two and a half miles 
is allotted to a brigade, it will of course be understood that the 
whole of this front need not be filled with men. A British 
division has 70 guns, and even assuming that the heavy battery 
is taken away, the remaining guns will require a space of about 
threequarters of a mile to come into action on, assuming no 
battery occupies more than IOO yards, and there are no gaps 
between batteries, this shows how some of the ground will be 
occupied. 
The divisional commander has in hand, by assumption, one 
brigade of infantry, all his artillery, one company of engineers, 
and one and a half companies of mounted infantry. After keep- 
ing back mounted men for orderlies, etc., he ought to have a 
whole company available, which no doubt will be principally 
employed in keeping up contact with neighbouring divisions. 
It would be unwise to aimlessly open fire with the whole of 
the artillery, as nothing much is known of the hostile position, 
and before a heavy bombardment is begun a target is necessary. 
The g u n s  should be distributed, say, by brigades, but linked 
up with the G.O.C. and C.R.A.  by telephone, so that though 
dispersed, concentration of fire is possible, and two positions 
should be entrenched and concealed as far as possible by every 
artifice known to the engineer. 
These gun positions will have been selected over night, not 
from any knowledge of the enemy’s position, but with a view to 
bringing fire, and if possible enfilade fire, on to localities which 
appear to be positions, the occupation of which will assist the 
further advance against the enemy’s position. 
The action will therefore probably begin with a section 
opening fire here and there, i.e., from each group on to what 
appear likely to be hostile gun positions, with a view to drawing 
fire, and so getting a target. hleanwhile the infantry is advanc- 
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REFLECTIONS ox THE TACTICS OF THE ATTACK. 164j 
ing, and this, though a palpable truth, is sonietirnes forgotten, 
and must  therefore be insisted on. When g u n s  are firing, the 
infantry must be advancing, otherwise the defence may keep 
their heads down or remain under ewer unharmed, and the value 
of the shell fire be wasted. 
The  infantry advance must of necessity be irregular, for no 
definite orders can have been given them beyond that they are 
to advance within certain limits. The  action will be a struggle 
for localities, in which the attacker will hare the advantage, as, 
having the initiative, he can.select his points of attack and mass 
superior forces against them. How brigadiers will deploy their 
commands will depend upon the circumstances of each case; but 
here, as  in the larger case of the army, there mill be a secondary 
and a main attack, and consequently there must be greater 
strength in one portion of the line than in the rest of it. If 
the attack has balloons, no doubt some information will be 
obtained by aerial observation ; but too much reliance must 
not be placed upon this information, as the  balloons must, from 
the necessity of the case be sent up some distance back, and the 
enemy being in position will have carefully hidden his men. 
Some part of the ground given to the brigade will no doubt be 
fairly open, and can be watched by a few scouts to give early 
notice of any hostile counter-stroke over it. The brigadiers will, 
of course, retain a reserve at their disposal ; what the size of this 
may be will depend upon circumstances, but the engineers and 
eight hlaxims should certainly form part of it. This grouping 
of machine g u n s  cn bntterie must not be assumed to mean that 
the employment of the guns as a battery is advocated, but that 
they should be at the disposal of the brigadier and not of the 
battalion commanders, for if each battalion has its two guns, 
it may often happen that the commanding officer will find no 
opportunity of using them, or i f  he does try to bring them into 
action they may be swamped or even prevented from opening 
fire; moreover, they are to a certain extent conspicuous, if in 
the firing l ine will show up, and i f  with the battalion reseme 
no opportunity for their useful employment may present itself. 
Machine g u n s  should only be brought into action at the critical 
moment to support an attack, confirm a success, or assist in 
warding off a counter-stroke, to do any of which they must be 
more useful when used by the brigadier who knows the situation 
of his whole l ine  than if left with individual battalions whose 
conimanding officers onry lino\v what is goining on in their 
immediate front. 
Again, if kept together, the question of ammunition supply 
is simplified; better lines of advance can be adopted, and they 
can be more easily kept concealCd than if forced to follow their 
battalions. AIoreover, having all eight guns under his com- 
mand, the brigadier will in all probability alvays have some 
ready to hand when he requires them ; and last, but not to be 
forgotten, the tactical training in peace time of eight g u n s  
massed is a simpler matter than if two are with each battalion. 
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1646 REFLECTIONS OX THE TACTICS OF T H E  ATTACK. 
At dawn we may assume that the infantry scouts go out in 
advance of the brigade; the sections of g u n s  open slow fire on 
likely points, get ranges, and draw fire. As the advance de- 
velops, some point of vantage-hill, wood, village, or what 
not-assumes supreme tactical importance, and, assuming this 
to be the case, the divisional general, in communication with 
the brigadier by telephone, will direct its capture and support the 
attack with the fire of his divisional artillery. Tlie brigadier- 
general will bring up his machine g u n s  and bring as much 
enfilade fire to bear as possible, and then, under cover of 
artillery fire, supported with. rifles and machine guns, the infantry 
will advance as  quickly as possible to the attack, and having the 
initiative, and assuming that orders, when the decision has been 
arrived at, are clear, the assault should be carried out with 
superior numbers and under cover of superior gun fire, and 
should succeed. A volume could be written on the subject of 
the formations to be adopted by the brigadier in such con- 
ditions; but as from what has been said above, forms of attack 
and distribution of troops must depend upon circumstances, 
and as no two sets of circumstances are the same, it is most 
injudicious to attempt to lay down any standard forms. One 
main principle only can be insisted upon, viz., that troops 
should be kept in hand as long as possible, and that it must 
be, remembered a time will come when artillery fire must cease, 
and that for the final struggle the attack, if it  is to succeed, must 
have succeeded in bringing superior. numbers to the decisive 
point. Too much stress cannot be laid on enfilade fire; it is 
not only very demoralising and more effective than direct fire, 
but it %an be maintained longer. The  artillery will no doubt 
have great difficulty in knowing when to cease fire, especially 
as distances increase and both sides adopt inconspicuous cloth- 
ing. To obviate the difficulty I think artillery officers will have 
to advance with the infantry, carrying a light telephone plant 
with them, by which they can communicate with their own com- 
manders and stop fire when it is harassing their own infantry. 
Flags may be carried by the advancing infantry to  show their 
artillery how far they have got on ! but there is danger that the 
enemy may have similar flags-and unfurl them at the very 
time the attacking g u n s  should be using the very greatest 
intensity of fire. 
As soon as any important locality has been seized, it must 
be at  once put into a state of defence to ensure its being held 
in the event of a counter-stroke, which is sure to be made as 
soon as the defence recognises the effect of its capture; and here 
again it is essential that the necessary tools should be available, 
and unless they are carried by the troops it is hard to see how 
they will be on the spot when required. IVhen a locality 
ippears of great importance or offers a stubborn resistance to 
capture, the brigadier will no doubt himself direct the attack, 
and i f  necessary put in his reserve. The machine g u n s  should 
therefore be at hand for the attack, which \ d l  more certainly 
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I<EFLECTIONS 0s T€iE TACTICS OF THE XTT;\CF;. 1647 
be the case if  they are niassed e n  bat ter ic  under the brigadier, 
and have not to be collected from the battalions, and i f  they are, 
i t  follows that they are available for the defensive arrangements 
against a counter-attack. 
As the advance progresses, the divisional general will also 
advance, and he should select sonie of the localities seized by 
his advancing troops to further fortify and hold them with his 
reserve to form a rallying point or points 011 which his front 
line can retire if it  should he beaten back. 
It must not, however, be expected that the advance in this 
preparatory stage will be all so simple as has been assumed 
above. Some locality niay prove too strong to be assaulted 
and talien by the first line troops, and the divisional general 
may have to intervene. From what has been said above it may 
be impossible, owing to aerial observation, to bring up reserves 
to reinforce the first line and to push home the attack without 
being observed, and so bring about a corresponding reinforce- 
ment on the part of the defence, in which case the necessary 
numerical superiority will not be established, and the assault, 
even i f  reinforced, fail. 
I t  is here that night work comes in, and it would appear 
best for the front line to hold ground it has gained t i l l  nightfall, 
when, under cover of darkness, reserves can be moved and 
artillery pushed up to positions from which the assault can he 
better assisted the following day. If this night concentration 
and change of position is carried out quietly and without adver- 
tisement, when day comes the defence will find itself overpowered 
by weight of numbers and gun fire, and the position will be 
carried. 
Supposing, however, it is a question of the last few hundred 
yards being so covered by fire that a daylight assault is im- 
practicable, an assault by night niay be necessary, when numbers 
will tell, as aimed fire will not have the effect it has by day. 
Cornnianders should confine their night operations to these two 
tactical operations, viz. : the reinforcement of troops insufficient 
in numbers to get on, and the actual assault. Long night 
marches and attacks at  dawn appear inadvisable unless they are 
the only means of covering open ground unnoticed, either from 
the air or.from the position, in which case they are necessary, 
and it is certain they will play an increasingly important part 
in the actual tactical operations on the battle-field, and must 
therefore be carefully practised by all arms in peace i f  tiicy are 
to fulfil their object in war. 
TTTe have now considered in detail what the attacking troops 
will be doing during the preparation, and we have seen that, 
thanks to the initiative enjoyed by their commander and to the 
ignorance the defence should be in as to what the attack is doing, 
if it has been judiciously handled, the position has been steadily 
if slowly approached. During all this.time the staff has been 
reconnoitring, studying the position with its weak and its 
strong points, and by the time the advance of the line has every- 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [A
riz
on
a S
tat
e U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ari
es
] a
t 2
0:2
2 2
6 J
un
e 2
01
6 
164s REFLECTIONS OX THE TACTICS OF THE ,\TTr\CK. 
where been checked, the Commander-in-Chief should be in a 
position to decide where he will make his decisive attack. The 
defence, if the preparation has been judiciously handled (all 
large-formed bodies being concealed not only from sight by the 
conformation of the ground but also from aerial observers by 
being kept in close country), should sti l l  be ignorant of where the 
main masses are, and should certainly be ignorant of the at- 
tacker's plans, and consequently cannot have any clear or correct 
idea as to when or where the main attacl; will be made. 
THE ASSAULT. 
The Commander-in-Chief, having decided how he will make 
his final effort, issues o'rders for the assault, and the considering 
stage is now past and the daring stage has been reached. It 
does not much matter for our purpose what these orders are, 
whether to pierce the centre or to envelop and roll up a flank; 
it is sufficient to assume that the orders for the assault have 
been issued. It does not, lion-ever, follow that the time for the 
actual asault has come. 
This final stage has its major and minor tactics; that is, as I 
understand the case-the collection of the various troops and 
forming them up for the attack, and the actual carrying out of 
the assault; and it is quite evidenT that until the troops are 
collected after having received their orders, no assault can take 
place. 
Let us therefore consider the major tactics of the assault 
before we deal with the actual assault itself. 
The preparatory stage consisted of, as has been shown, a 
gradual advance all along the line without developing any great 
strength, and in which risks were taken which the small numbers 
deployed did not justify, as  it was confidently expected that the 
defence, deprived of the initiative, would be unable to db more 
than guess where the assault was likely to be made, and con- 
sequently would be slow to develop any powerful counter-stroke 
against the weak advancing troops; but a time must come when 
such a n  advance is no longer possible, and this is the commence- 
ment of the decisive stage or assault. As has been explained 
above, all ground gained must at once be entrenched and placed 
in a state Of defence with a view to its being held against hostile 
counter-attacks, and this is possible even with inferior numbers 
for quite long enough to cnable reinforcements to come 
up, owing to the great p o w r  of resistance possessed by even a 
small force armed with modern weapons. Thus, when the Com- 
mander-in-Chief finds his whole thin advancing line checked, 
and has to decide where he will assault, we may espect to find 
his front line entrenched at  some distance, varying according 
to circumstances, from the defensive position. I t  is therefore 
from this distance-whatever it may be-that the main assault 
will have to be launched, and it is the duty of the staff to issue 
such orders as will ensure the required troops being concentrated 
unobserved by the enemy at the required point or points. 
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REFLECTIOSS ON THE TACTICS OF THE ATTr1CI-C. 1649 
* .  1 his requires careful norking out, and even after tlie orders 
are actually issued may be a long process, for as has been 
already mentioned, the mystification and surprise of the enemy 
is what has to be aimed at, and if large bodies of men and masses 
of g u n s  are moved about by day, they may, even if under cover 
from the position, be seen by the aerial observers of the defence, 
or at any rate, show by the clouds of dust they raise that large 
bodies of troops are on the move in certain directions, and 
thereby give the defence a hint as to the intentions of the attack. 
From the above considerations i t  follon-s that these con- 
centrating movements, where large bodies are concerned, must 
be carried out by night, and as  movements by night are slow, 
more than one night may be necessary. Even when the troops 
are collected in the immediate vicinity of the position to be 
assaulted, there is much administrative work to be done before 
the assault can be launched, so \re may assume that some time 
must elapse after the slow advance of the preparatory stage 
has been checked and the point to be assaulted has been decided 
upon before the assault is actually commenced. 
The first care of the attacking general will be, without 
doubt, to get his guns,  and especially his heavy g u n s  and 
howitzers, into good and concealed positions, from which to 
cover the advance of the assaulting troops. The heavy guns 
and howitzers are especially important to bring up, as by 
now we may expect that the defence has put up sufficient head 
cover to ward off shrapnel fire. 
As in any modern army, howitzers and heavy guns are few 
in comparison with field g u n s ,  it  may be necessary to collect 
them from considerable distances, which \rill take time; and if 
the first night is not sufficient to concentrate the necessary heavy 
artillery, ‘great care must be taken when the fight is continued 
nest day not to disclose intentions by ceasing fire with heavy 
artillery from positions where it was active tlie day before. It 
may be a good plan to cease fire with the heavy g u n s  and 
howitzers opposite the point to be assiulted until  all is ready; 
but this all depends upon circumstances, the great object to be 
arrived at being surprise. 
IVe thus see that the major tactics of the assault stage 
resolve, themselves into concentrating unperceived strong bodies 
of infantry to carry out the-final assault and a preponderating 
mass of guns, wi th  a proportion of heavy g u n s  and howitzers 
opposite tlie point selected for the final effort, to cover the advance 
of the assaulting infantry. As the close artillery support of 
infantry committed to a decisive assault is most important, i t  
may be advisable to have several batteries of horse artillery near 
at hand which, thanks to tHeir mobility, can more readily effect 
rapid changes of position than slower moving guns .  
In the final stage ire want our mounted troops to fulfil a 
-double &lc, viz., screening and protection. The former is the 
duty of the independent cavalrv, the lattcr that of the mounted 
brigades and divisional cavalry, who must \rork in close com- 
bination with the assaulting troops. 
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1650 
The independent cavalry wide on the flanks will be espected 
to prevent the hostile cavalry seeing what is going on, and to 
be active against the enemy’s line of coniniunications, and to 
be ready to harass his retreat in the event of a successful assault. 
The mounted brigades must give early intimation of any serious 
counter-stroke and malie the first resistance against it in order 
to give the assaulting troops time to form to repulse it; other- 
wise in the confusion of the assault the counter-stroke may, by 
appearing suddenly, throw the assault into confusion and beat 
it back even when success is practically achieved. 
The actual assault may take place by day or night; the 
former, if i t  appears to offer a good chance of success, is 
preferable, as confusion is avoided, the retreating enemy can 
be followed u p  by fire, and generally more decisive results can 
be obtained. On the other hand, a daylight assault may fail 
or appear impracticable, and there be nothing for it but to try a 
night attack, when it is not unfair to assume that fire cannot 
play the ail-important 78Ze it does by day, and that numbers 
are far more valuable than when aimed fire is possible. 
\Ire will assume that 
our concentration has been successfully carried out and that the 
defence has not found out what was going on until it is too late 
to bring up large reinforcements. In these circumstances the 
more rapid the advance the more probable its success. 
The artillery to cover the attack \ d l  most usefully be em- 
ployed firing indirect, for the point to be assaulted is fised and 
not moving, hence there is no great necessity of being able to 
see over the sights. Some g u n s ,  however, must be able to fire 
direct. These should be on the flanks, so that they may be able 
at once to turn on any counter-stroke which map be launched by 
the defender, for these counter-attacking troops will be moving, 
consequently direct fire will be more useful, seeing that the 
range can be got quicker and changed more rapidly when firing 
direct than indirect, and as the element of time is all important 
in warding off a counter-stroke, this ability quicltly to alter the 
range and direction cannot b> over-estimated. 
The orders having been given them, a rapid fire is poured in 
from every available gun on the position to be assaulted ; the 
more converging the fire the more eflective it will be. Under 
cover of this fire the attacking infantry will move out and 
advance quickly, halting as little as possible, for it must he 
remembered that losses are smaller on the niove than when 
halted. Halts wlien necessary will of course be made as far 
as possible under cover. The formations to be adopted will vary 
with the ground, but must be such that for the actual assault 
there will be weight. JIThen this-stage has been reached, it 
would appear as though the infantry soldier must trust  to the 
bayonet more than to the fire effect of his rifle. The covering 
artillery must keep up its fire until  the very latest possible 
moment, for as soon as it has ceased fire the defence, unexposed 
to artillery fire may be espected to commence a rapid aimed fire 
IXFLECTIOGS 0s THE l x i i c s  OF THE ATTACK. 
Let us  consider a daylight assault. 
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REFLECTIONS ON THE TACTICS OF THE ATTACK. IGjI 
which may stop theattack and hurl it back. If this occurs, the 
g u n s  of the attack mus t  commence firing as soon as ever they 
can in order to keep down the fire of the defence and so save 
the beaten infantry much loss, If the position cannot be won, 
the attack must entrench and await the arrival of night to charge 
over these last few hundred yards. The guns of the attack 
having to cease fire should be the signal for the machine guns 
to open on the defenders lining their trenches. Every effort must 
therefore be made to bring up the machine guns as near the 
front line as possible. Their detachments must expect heavy 
losses, for as soon a s  they open, they will become the target 
of every hostile gun and rifle which can turn on them. 
The attacking guns must therefore be ready as soon as they 
have to cease fire on the ihfantry trenches to turn on the guns 
of the defence in order to save the machine guns as much as  
possible. One very important point must not be forgotten 
when launching troops to a decisive assault, and this is, 'that 
though strength and weight are necessary €0 drive home an 
attack, still there can be too many men, which will only be a 
hindrance instead of an assistance. 
Although we have been considering the assault of one par- 
ticular part of the position as though it  m s  a particular phase 
of the action, in practice it  will most probably be the case that 
there mill be no general assault on one particular part of the 
line, and that the preparation will merge into the assault, and 
there will be decisive assaults all along the line similar to the 
general assault we have just considered, though on a smaller 
scale, and that from the points so gained, enfilade fire on other 
parts of the position will render them untenable, and so enable 
the position to be gradually won. 
This is what happened in the Manchurian battles, and is 
what will probably happen again, and success or failure be due 
to the i'nfelligent niutual support of brigades and even smaller 
units engaged in what may appear local struggles for localities. 
If, however, a general assault of one particular point is feasible 
and can be carried out, success will be more decisive than if 
the-position is won by a succession of local struggles. 
Success to be decisive must drive the adversary off his com- 
munications, but this, with the increasing size of modern armies, 
becomes more and more dificult, as the attack must think of its 
own just as much a s t h e  defence, and the victory will be quiclay 
turned into defeat should the victorious troops moving off their 
lines of supply be caught when their ammunition is eshausted 
by even a small body of fresh troops. 
hIoreover, a large modern army will have several. lines of 
supply, and if driven off, one wili  endeavour, often with success, 
to fall back by another ; thus a strategically decisive success'will 
become rarer 'and rarer as armies increase in size, and final 
success will be the result of complete loss of inoral due to a 
succession of tactical defeats, though none may have had decisive 
strategical results. 
. 
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1652 REFLECTIONS ON THE TACTICS OF THE ATTACK. 
The conclusion to be arrived at  is that, other things being 
equal, success depends upon the man rather than on the men, 
that the initiative is the keystone of success, that good com- 
munication on the battle-field will largely compensate for 
numbers, and tha't with good troops on both sides, even allow- 
ing for all the advantages to 6e obtained by enfilade and cover- 
i n g  fire, by skilful massing of superior numb'ers at  a decisive 
point, a n a  by judicious use of the entrenching tools, the final 
decision will have to be fought out with cold steel, very possibly, 
under cover of darkness. 
Thus it is the human element, after all, that is decisive, 
the man dominating the men, the moral to the physical, as 
success to f ai '1 ure. 
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